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AIRBNB IN NEW YORK CITY: 
WHOSE PRIVACY RIGHTS ARE THREATENED 
BY A GOVERNMENT DATA GRAB? 
Tess Hofmann* 
 
New York City regulators have vigorously resisted the rise of Airbnb as an 
alternative to traditional hotels, characterizing “home sharing” as a trend 
that is sucking up permanent housing in a city already facing an affordability 
crisis.  However, laws banning short-term rentals have done little to 
discourage this practice, as Airbnb’s policy of keeping user information 
private makes it possible for illegal operators to evade law enforcement.  
Frustrated by this power imbalance, the New York City Council passed Local 
Law 146, which requires Airbnb to provide city officials with access to the 
names and information of its home sharing hosts on a monthly basis to assist 
with law enforcement efforts.  Airbnb claims that the ordinance is a flagrant 
violation of its own privacy rights and the rights of its customers. 
Local Law 146 is the culmination of the regulatory struggle over Airbnb 
in New York City, but it is also a flash point for government data-collection 
efforts generally.  Because of the massive potential of using private 
companies’ data to aid in law enforcement efforts, the implementation of 
data-collection statutes could be an attractive policing tool.  Using Local 
Law 146 as a lens, this Note examines the privacy issues implicated by data-
collection laws and discusses which parties can assert these privacy rights, 
particularly given recent changes in third-party doctrine jurisprudence.  
Ultimately, this Note concludes that, while the outcome of Airbnb’s challenge 
to Local Law 146 will be an important indicator, the suit will not resolve the 
question of whether individual Airbnb hosts could successfully challenge this 
law without the support of the company.  Individual challenges to sweeping 
data-collection statutes could be the next frontier in breaking down the third-
party doctrine’s barrier to Fourth Amendment protections. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment,1 originally enacted to protect against trespass in 
the home by police,2 today also safeguards troves of online data from being 
commandeered by the government as a superpowered law enforcement tool.  
In New York City, classic home-based privacy concerns have dovetailed 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:  Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004). 
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with online data privacy concerns in a struggle over the regulation of 
Airbnb.3 
The rise of Airbnb and fellow “home sharing” websites, which allow users 
to list spaces to rent for overnight stays,4 has been met with a cascade of 
regulation in New York City.5  Opponents of home sharing, including the 
New York City Council, claim the practice exacerbates the dearth of 
affordable housing for city residents by removing potential full-time rentals 
from the market,6 creates nuisances in peaceful residential buildings where 
full-time residents do not expect a constant stream of strangers,7 and 
potentially exposes short-term renters to dangerous conditions in regular 
apartments that are not outfitted to the same standards as legal hotel rooms.8 
The city’s latest salvo is Local Law 146, an ordinance effectively requiring 
home sharing sites to hand over all user records on a monthly basis so that 
city agents automatically have the information needed to enforce local short-
 
 3. Throughout this Note, Airbnb is sometimes used as a catchall term for home sharing 
service providers.  Airbnb is the market leader in home sharing.  Expedia, which owns 
HomeAway, ranks second. See Riley McDermid, With HomeAway Growing Like Crazy, 
Expedia Closes in on Airbnb for Market Share, AUSTIN BUS. J. (July 25, 2017, 1:45 PM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/austin/news/2017/07/25/with-homeaway-growing-like-crazy-
expedia-closes-in.html [https://perma.cc/BP5U-C74Q]. 
 4. Airbnb is an online platform that allows users to advertise and rent out extra rooms or 
entire homes for short-term periods and provides a system for leaving ratings and reviews of 
those rentals. See How Do Reviews Work?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/ 
article/13/how-do-reviews-work [https://perma.cc/C88M-PCFX] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); 
How to Start Hosting, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/b/setup [https://perma.cc/X9YV-
YPDX] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).  The service boasts a global reach. Brian Solomon, How 
Airbnb Expanded to 190 Countries by Thinking ‘Glocal,’ FORBES (May 3, 2016, 2:30 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/05/03/how-airbnb-expanded-to-190-
countries-by-thinking-glocal/#5aca6fcf7e91 [https://perma.cc/GM4H-758U]. 
 5. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Airbnb Sues over New Law Regulating New York Rentals, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/technology/new-york-
passes-law-airbnb.html [https://perma.cc/3YU9-8YBU]; Katie Honan, New York City Council 
Passes Bill to Regulate Airbnb, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/new-york-city-council-passes-bill-to-regulate-airbnb-1531952763 [https://perma.cc/ 
2SGX-CTVR]; S. Jhoanna Robledo, Hey, Wanna Rent My Couch?, N.Y. MAG.  
(Nov. 27, 2011), http://nymag.com/realestate/realestatecolumn/short-term-rentals-2011-12/ 
[https://perma.cc/H284-NZVJ]. 
 6. See BUREAU OF BUDGET, OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, THE IMPACT OF 
AIRBNB ON NYC RENTS 1 (2018), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
documents/AirBnB_050318.pdf [https://perma.cc/84FK-SG3R]; see also Luis Ferré-
Sadurní, To Curb Illegal Airbnbs, New York City Wants to Collect Data on Hosts, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/nyregion/illegal-airbnb-new-york-
city-bill.html [https://perma.cc/7Y2U-W5DM].  But cf. Robert McClendon, MIT Professor 
Skeptical of Airbnb’s Impact on New Orleans Housing Prices, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 22, 
2015), https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/09/mit_professor_skeptical_of_air.html 
[https://perma.cc/6TPR-ZXJB] (questioning the popular opinion that Airbnb rentals drive up 
housing costs). 
 7. See MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, A10008, St. Assemb., 233d Legis. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2010), https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A10008& 
term=2009&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Memo=Y [https://perma.cc/BH7G-AGRY]. 
 8. Id. 
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term rental laws.9  Airbnb sued the city over the ordinance and won a 
preliminary injunction against its enactment.10  An interlocutory appeal is 
now pending before the Second Circuit.11  In its lawsuit, Airbnb characterizes 
the law as a gross overreach and claims it is illegal under the Fourth 
Amendment administrative search doctrine and the Stored Communications 
Act.12  In defense, the city argues that Airbnb is asserting rights that belong 
to its customers, whose privacy rights are nonexistent in this circumstance 
under the third-party doctrine.13 
This Note explores whether Local Law 146 is a viable mechanism for 
stopping violations of New York City’s short-term rental laws perpetuated 
by Airbnb hosts, or whether this law violates the privacy rights of Airbnb, 
the hosts who use home sharing sites to rent their homes, or both.  Part I 
discusses the history of regulating home sharing in New York State and New 
York City.  Part II discusses the privacy concerns potentially implicated by 
Local Law 146.  Part III lays out the privacy arguments made by Airbnb in 
its recent lawsuit and explains how the Southern District of New York 
evaluated these arguments.  Part IV suggests that courts should recognize the 
Fourth Amendment rights of individual Airbnb hosts who are affected by this 
law or similar laws in the future, despite the third-party doctrine. 
I.  NEW YORK CITY’S PROTECTIONIST POLICIES AND AIRBNB’S RESPONSE 
There is a conflict brewing in New York City between Airbnb, regulators, 
and the hotel industry.  This Part explores how ineffectual short-term rental 
laws prompted the New York City Council to pass Local Law 146 and 
examines several other cities’ data-sharing laws. 
A.  The Problem of Airbnb in New York City 
After hearing excessive barking, residents of a building decide to complain 
to their landlord that a neighbor is operating an illegal kennel from his 
apartment through dog-sitting gigs found on Rover.com.  The landlord is 
busy and unconcerned, so the residents report it to the local buildings 
department, and the neighbor subsequently gets a notice from the code 
enforcer.  The entrepreneurial neighbor would then have time to reconsider 
 
 9. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 26-2101 to -2105 (2019).  The uncodified 
version of this municipal law was Local Law 146, and this Note uses that popular name to 
refer to this legislation. 
 10. Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 
2019 WL 91990, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-288 (2d. Cir. Jan. 31, 
2019). 
 11. Id.; Notice of Appeal at 1, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 
18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), ECF No. 93. 
 12. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New 
York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), 
ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Airbnb Complaint]. 
 13. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 7–9, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 
(PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), ECF No. 27 [hereinafter NYC Memo in 
Opposition]. 
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his position and take on fewer dogs the next week, hopefully never interfering 
with his neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of their apartments again. 
This hypothetical presents the typical lifecycle of a residential code 
violation—housing maintenance codes are enforced on an ad hoc basis.14  
But what if, rather than waiting for complaints, New York City made 
commercial dog-sitting in an apartment a fineable offense, and then required 
Rover.com to disclose all of its records to the government each month?  This 
solution would likely be effective, but would it strike the proper balance 
between privacy and law enforcement? 
This tactic is the one that New York City has tried to adopt in dealing with 
Airbnb and other home sharing services.  The prospect of passively renting 
extra space to tourists has proven popular among New Yorkers.  In its court 
filings, Airbnb admits that as, of June 1, 2018, there were approximately 
28,000 “entire home” Airbnb listings in New York City, which represents 
about 0.8 percent of New York City homes.15  As of March 2019, there were 
over 47,000 Airbnb listings in the city, including over 23,000 entire homes, 
according to Inside Airbnb, a website that analyzes publicly available 
information about Airbnb.16  Airbnb’s immense popularity, combined with a 
historically passive approach to policing illegal building use, have created 
novel problems in New York City housing code enforcement. 
B.  The History of the Battle Between Airbnb and New York Regulators 
While cities like San Francisco have opted to legitimize the business of 
Airbnb rentals by creating processes through which hosts register with the 
municipality,17 New York has outright banned short-term rentals of 
apartments.18  The one major exception is that New York hosts can rent space 
within their homes if they are present at the same time as the guest—offering 
just a room or rooms rather than an entire private home.19  In 2010, the New 
York State Legislature enacted a new law prohibiting the rental of units in 
 
 14. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., THE ABCS OF HOUSING:  HOUSING RULES 
AND REGULATIONS FOR OWNERS AND TENANTS 3 (2014), http://www1.nyc.gov/portal/apps/311 
_literatures/HPD/ABCs-housing-singlepg.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ92-WWKG] (explaining 
the process for tenants to report housing code violations); Illegal Building Conversion or 
Occupancy Complaint, NYC.GOV, https://www1.nyc.gov/nyc-resources/service/1891/illegal-
building-conversion-or-occupancy-complaint [https://perma.cc/52Q8-E8E4] (last visited Apr. 
10, 2019) (providing a complaint form for residents to report illegal conversions). 
 15. See Airbnb Complaint, supra note 12, at 4. 
 16. New York City, INSIDE AIRBNB, http://insideairbnb.com/new-york-city/ 
[https://perma.cc/U8RK-YFXR] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 17. See San Francisco, CA, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/871/san-
francisco--ca [https://perma.cc/NTA9-CTD2] (last updated Aug. 28, 2017). 
 18. See Illegal Short-Term Rentals, N.Y.C. OFF. SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/specialenforcement/enforcement/illegal-short-term-rentals.page 
[https://perma.cc/SWT4-KV2Z] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 19. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(8)(a) (McKinney 2019); see also Abe Carrey, 
Appeal Nos. 1300602, 1300736 (N.Y.C. Envtl. Control Bd. 2013), http://archive.citylaw.org/ 
ecb/Long%20Form%20Orders/2013/1300602---1300736.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9HN-
PNHQ] (affirming the legality of hosting a paying guest while the permanent resident remains 
in the home). 
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Class A multiple dwellings for fewer than thirty days.20  Class A multiple 
dwellings are residential buildings with three or more units, as opposed to 
Class B multiple dwellings, which encompass hotels, boarding houses, and 
dormitories.21  In 2016, the New York State Legislature passed another law 
that made it illegal to advertise apartments for short-term rental and created 
civil penalties escalating from $1000 for a first violation to $7500 for 
repeated violations.22  These two laws together have earned New York City 
a reputation as the American city most hostile to Airbnb.23 
The hotel industry has also inserted itself into the fight against Airbnb in 
New York City.24  The American Hotel and Lodging Association, spurred by 
home sharing services cutting into its customer base,25 has launched a 
“multipronged, national campaign approach at the local, state and federal 
level” aimed at minimizing Airbnb’s reach.26  Airbnb and hotel industry 
groups have traded barbs—with the Hotel Association of New York City 
once suggesting that Airbnb rentals could expose residents to transient 
terrorists,27 and Airbnb promoting the idea that it is good for the city28 and 
suggesting that city council members are corrupted by hotel industry 
campaign donations.29  This rhetoric aside, city regulators and the hotel lobby 
have found themselves on the same side of the fight against Airbnb. 
 
 20. MULT. DWELL. § 4(8)(a). 
 21. See id. § 4(8)–(9). 
 22. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 121 (McKinney 2019). 
 23. See Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban 
Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215, 249 (2016); J. T. Minor, Note, Foregoing the 
Cleaver for the Scalpel:  How New York Can Add Some Nuance to Its Short-Term Rental 
Laws, 103 IOWA L. REV. 817, 831 (2018); Nick Tabor, Is New York Cracking Down on Airbnb 
to Help Local Residents or Hotels?, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 13, 2018), http://nymag.com/ 
intelligencer/2018/08/airbnb-new-york-crack-down.html [https://perma.cc/B3TV-XMRK]. 
 24. See Will Bredderman, Hotels Target Airbnb in Mail and Ad Blitz, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. 
(Apr. 6, 2018, 12:00 AM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20180406/ 
REAL_ESTATE/180409933/hotels-target-airbnb-in-mail-and-ad-blitz [https://perma.cc/9A 
4A-Z8H6]; Jake Offenhartz, Hotel Industry Releases Attack Ad Accusing Airbnb of Enabling 
Terrorists, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 1, 2017, 9:27 AM), http://gothamist.com/2017/08/01/ 
airbnb_terrorism_ad.php [https://perma.cc/GCD8-P82N]. 
 25. Dina Gerdeman, The Airbnb Effect:  Cheaper Rooms for Travelers, Less Revenue for 
Hotels, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2018, 12:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
hbsworkingknowledge/2018/02/27/the-airbnb-effect-cheaper-rooms-for-travelers-less-
revenue-for-hotels/ [https://perma.cc/MP9N-TF9D]. 
 26. Katie Benner, Inside the Hotel Industry’s Plan to Combat Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/technology/inside-the-hotel-industrys-plan-
to-combat-airbnb.html [https://perma.cc/9MCJ-VK8U]. 
 27. Kenneth Lovett, New York City’s Hotel Industry Links Airbnb to Terror in Harsh Ad, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 31, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/new-
york-city-hotel-industry-links-airbnb-terror-harsh-ad-article-1.3370202 [https://perma.cc/Y9 
JF-GQVQ]. 
 28. Jack Smith IV, Airbnb’s Latest Subway Propaganda Reminds You That You Love, 
Support Airbnb, OBSERVER (Aug. 29, 2014, 12:18 PM), https://observer.com/ 
2014/08/airbnbs-latest-subway-propaganda-reminds-you-that-you-love-support-airbnb/ 
[https://perma.cc/JUP4-3KPG]. 
 29. Joe Anuta, Airbnb Questions Hotel Union’s Campaign Contributions to City Council 
Members, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (June 22, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.crainsnewyork.com/ 
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In 2014, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman attempted to 
subpoena comprehensive host data from Airbnb for all New York State hosts 
as part of an investigation into potential violations of short-term rental laws.30  
Airbnb succeeded in getting the subpoena quashed as overbroad, since it 
asked for the information of all New York State hosts despite the fact that the 
short-term rental laws do not apply to cities with fewer than 325,000 
citizens.31  Soon after, Airbnb agreed to release anonymized data on hosts, 
with names and addresses stripped, which Schneiderman would have one 
year to review.32  Under the agreement, if the investigation revealed 
suspicious illegal activity, Airbnb would have to turn over the hosts’ 
identifying details,33 which Airbnb ultimately did for 124 hosts.34  From that 
point forward, Airbnb also agreed to require New York State hosts to view a 
warning about the short-term rental laws and applicable taxes prior to listing 
their space.35 
In 2015, Airbnb tried to increase transparency and collaboration with law 
enforcement by announcing a commitment to “provide cities with the 
information they need to make informed decisions about home sharing 
policies” in a mission statement titled the Airbnb Community Compact.36  In 
conjunction with this statement, the company voluntarily released a trove of 
anonymized data on New York City hosts, including statistics like host 
earnings, types of listings, and how often hosts rent their spaces.37 
This cooperation did not last long.  In 2016, Airbnb filed suit against 
Schneiderman and the City of New York over the amendments to the city 
and state laws making advertisement of short-term rentals a fineable 
offense.38  Airbnb claimed that these amendments violated the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 by making the company liable for 
third-party postings on its platform.39  That suit was settled in just two 
months, with the City promising that only hosts would be held responsible 
 
article/20180622/REAL_ESTATE/180629966/on-the-offensive-airbnb-questions-hotel-
union-s-campaign-contributions-to-city-council-members [https://perma.cc/S369-AK5R]. 
 30. See Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790–91 (Sup. Ct. 2014). 
 31. Id. at 791–92. 
 32. David Streitfeld, Airbnb Will Hand Over Host Data to New York, N.Y. TIMES (May 
21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/technology/airbnb-will-hand-over-host-
data-to-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/P6WJ-56CK]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Pui-Wing Tam & Christie Smythe, Airbnb Turns Over Data on Top New York City 
Hosts to State Attorney General, SKIFT (Aug. 23, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://skift.com/ 
2014/08/23/airbnb-turns-over-data-on-top-new-york-city-hosts-to-state-attorney-general/ 
[https://perma.cc/GFP8-3T2Q]. 
 35. Streitfeld, supra note 32. 
 36. See The Airbnb Community Compact, AIRBNB CITIZEN, 
https://www.airbnbcitizen.com/community-compact/ [https://perma.cc/B4EK-N9KX] (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 37. Mike Isaac, Airbnb Releases Trove of New York City Home-Sharing Data, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/technology/airbnb-releases-trove-of-
new-york-city-home-sharing-data.html [https://perma.cc/1QT7-R3CH]. 
 38. Benner, supra note 5. 
 39. Id. 
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and fined, rather than Airbnb.40  In its notice of dismissal, Airbnb vowed to 
continue to work cooperatively with the city on ways to address the 
permanent housing shortage, and the company committed to encourage its 
hosts’ compliance with Airbnb’s “One Host, One Home”41 policy.42  Despite 
this promise, the city has struggled to enforce hosts’ compliance with its 
short-term rental regulations. 
C.  Enforcement Issues 
Passing clear-cut legislation is one thing, but actually enforcing these 
provisions when the illegal activity takes place inside private homes has 
proven quite difficult.43  Because Airbnb does not display the real names and 
addresses of its hosts on its website, New York City agents are stymied, as 
they cannot access a comprehensive list of Airbnb hosts in the city.44  Like 
the code enforcer checking on the dog-sitter,45 city officials are confined to 
traditional investigative tactics:  following tips from complaining neighbors, 
knocking on doors and asking questions, and occasionally staking out 
suspicious buildings with video cameras.46  The city has reportedly even used 
leads generated by private investigators paid by the hotel lobby.47  These 
inspections have led Airbnb48 and its hosts49 to accuse city agents of 
harassment. 
In addition to being irksome to hosts and guests, the process of 
investigating tens of thousands of potential illegal rentals using these tactics 
 
 40. Katie Benner, Airbnb Ends Fight with New York City over Fines, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/technology/airbnb-ends-fight-with-new-york-
city-over-fines.html [https://perma.cc/5RJ5-EC7H]. 
 41. See generally One Host, One Home:  New York City (January 2019 Update), AIRBNB 
1 (2019), https://2sqy5r1jf93u30kwzc1smfqt-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/01/One-Host-One-Home-_-January-2019-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B3W-JWF6] 
(providing information on the percentage of New York City Airbnb hosts with only one entire 
home listing available). 
 42. NY Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal at 2, Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, No. 
16-cv-8239 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2016), ECF No. 32. 
 43. See Jennifer Peltz, The Team Tasked with Snooping Out Illegal Hotels and Airbnb 
Listings in NYC, SKIFT (Mar. 30, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://skift.com/2015/03/30/the-team-
tasked-with-snooping-out-illegal-hotels-and-airbnb-hosts-in-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/S2AL-
263Z]. 
 44. See Declaration of Christian Klossner in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions for a 
Preliminary Injunction at 13, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 
Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Klossner Declaration]. 
 45. See supra Part I.A. 
 46. See Peltz, supra note 43. 
 47. Josh Eidelson, Hotel Money Is Funding Anti-Airbnb Sting Operations, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 12, 2017, 6:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
07-12/hotel-money-is-funding-anti-airbnb-sting-operations [https://perma.cc/9P5N-XXFL]. 
 48. Sally Goldenberg, New York City Poised to Join Airbnb Crackdown, POLITICO (May 
15, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2018/05/14/ 
new-york-city-poised-to-join-others-in-cracking-down-on-airbnb-418835 [https://perma.cc/ 
BM4X-3AXE]. 
 49. Christopher Robbins, Airbnb Host Sues City After Receiving $32K in Fines, 
GOTHAMIST (July 18, 2018, 2:08 PM), http://gothamist.com/2018/07/18/ 
airbnb_nyc_lawsuit_fines.php [https://perma.cc/97TM-DKFY]. 
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is resource intensive.50  But rather than surrender, New York City has 
devoted increasing resources to enforcing the laws.51  In a 2016 executive 
order, Mayor Bill de Blasio recast the mission of the Office of Special 
Enforcement (OSE), a city agency once focused on issues including the sale 
of counterfeit goods and prostitution,52 to focus on enforcing the prohibition 
against advertising short-term rentals.53  OSE conducted over 3500 
inspections in 2017, up from 1695 inspections in 2016.54  According to 
Christian Klossner, the executive director of OSE, the agency’s enforcement 
capabilities have been outpaced by a massive increase in short-term rental 
listings.55 
Despite OSE’s efforts, the presence of illegal inventory on Airbnb has 
persisted.  A 2014 report by the state attorney general’s office found that 72 
percent of units booked as short-term rentals on Airbnb violated the ban on 
renting entire homes for fewer than thirty days.56  A 2016 report from 
Housing Conservation Coordinators and MFY Legal Services found that 56 
percent of Airbnb’s New York City listings were likely illegal.57  A McGill 
University report in 2018 found that illegal listings account for 
approximately 42 to 46 percent of all active New York City Airbnb listings, 
which comprises 66 percent of all host revenue,58 and that Airbnb has 
removed between 7000 and 13,500 units of housing from New York City’s 
long-term rental market.59  Helpless to enforce the existing laws, the New 
York City Council adopted a creative solution. 
 
 50. See Rosa Goldensohn, De Blasio Ramps Up Airbnb Enforcement, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. 
(Apr. 26, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20170426/ 
REAL_ESTATE/170429915/mayor-bill-de-blasio-budgets-1-6-million-to-crack-down-on-
airbnb [https://perma.cc/F399-KVZN] (discussing the city’s expansion of the Office of 
Special Enforcement from thirty-two to forty-eight staffers). 
 51. See id.; see also Klossner Declaration, supra note 44, at 4. 
 52. See Stu Loeser & Virginia Lam, Mayor Bloomberg Creates the Office of Special 
Enforcement to Expand Enforcement Initiatives Across the City and Improve Quality of Life 
in All Five Boroughs, NYC.GOV (Dec. 14, 2006), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/434-06/mayor-bloomberg-creates-office-special-enforcement-expand-
enforcement-initiatives-across [https://perma.cc/M3ZL-F9D6]. 
 53. See CITY OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 22, OFFICE OF 
SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT—UNLAWFUL ADVERTISEMENTS FOR CERTAIN OCCUPANCIES (2016), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/executive-orders/2016/eo_22.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F625-LFYA]. 
 54. See Klossner Declaration, supra note 44, at 4. 
 55. See id. at 9. 
 56. RESEARCH DEP’T & INTERNET BUREAU, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
AIRBNB IN THE CITY 8 (2014), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N5FM-ZAXY]. 
 57. BJH ADVISORS LLC, SHORT CHANGING NEW YORK CITY:  THE IMPACT OF AIRBNB ON 
NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING MARKET 24 (2016), http://mobilizationforjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/Shortchanging-NYC.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LAE-WFJV]. 
 58. DAVID WACHSMUTH ET AL., MCGILL UNIV., THE HIGH COST OF SHORT-TERM RENTALS 
IN NEW YORK CITY 15 (2018), https://mcgill.ca/newsroom/files/newsroom/channels/ 
attach/airbnb-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H25-NT4T]. 
 59. Id. at 25. 
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D.  Local Law 146 
Faced with the meteoric rise in popularity of short-term rentals with no 
slowdown in sight, the New York City Council passed Local Law 146.60  The 
council unanimously approved the bill,61 and Mayor Bill de Blasio signed it 
into law on August 6, 2018.62  Before being preliminarily enjoined by the 
Southern District of New York, the law was set to take effect in February 
2019.63 
Local Law 146 requires home sharing services such as Airbnb to submit a 
monthly report to OSE including the following details of each rental:  the 
physical address of the premises; the legal name, phone number, email 
address, and physical address of the host; the URL of the listing; the number 
of the listing; whether the rental involved the entire dwelling or part of the 
dwelling; the total number of days it was rented; the amount of fees received 
by the booking service; the amount of rent received by the host; and the 
anonymized identifier for the account number used by the host to receive 
payments or, alternatively, the account name and account number.64  The law 
also requires the home sharing service to obtain consent for this disclosure 
from its users as a condition of listing their property on the service.65  If 
accurate reports are not submitted, the law provides for the home sharing 
service to be fined up to $1500 per listing per month.66  According to 
Klossner, “The additional information to be provided to the City pursuant to 
Local Law 146 will enhance OSE’s research and investigative capabilities 
and will provide OSE with the tools needed to effectively and efficiently 
combat increasing illegal and unsafe transient use in the City.”67 
Airbnb and its competitor HomeAway filed suit against the City of New 
York, claiming that the law creates an illegal administrative search.68  As 
Airbnb framed the issue before the court:  “In short, neither New York City, 
nor any other city, nor any state, nor the federal government, has ever tried 
 
 60. Honan, supra note 5. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Press Release, Mayor de Blasio Signs Legislation Regarding the Department of 
Correction, Bail Bonds, Senior Centers, and Short Term Rentals (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/398-18/mayor-de-blasio-signs-legislation-
the-department-correction-bail-bonds-senior#/0 [https://perma.cc/CEN6-ZDQM]. 
 63. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 26-2101 to -2105 (2019); Airbnb, Inc. v. 
City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 91990, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-288 (2d. Cir. Jan. 31, 2019). 
 64. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 26-2102 (2019). 
 65. Id. 
 66. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 26-2104 (2019). 
 67. Klossner Declaration, supra note 44, at 9. 
 68. Airbnb Complaint, supra note 12, at 23; Complaint to Declare Invalid and Enjoin 
Enforcement of New York City Administrative Code Sections 26-2101–26.2104 at 21, 
Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 
91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) [hereinafter HomeAway Complaint].  These lawsuits were 
designated as related and assigned to the same judge in the Southern District of New York. 
See Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 91990, at *1 n.1. 
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anything like this ever before.”69  The home sharing sites claim that the law 
bypasses the usual requirement of a warrant by requiring the sites to turn over 
business records on a regular basis without probable cause; thus, the law 
violates both their privacy rights and the privacy rights of hosts under the 
Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications Act.70 
In January 2019, the district court granted the home sharing sites’ request 
for a preliminary injunction of the ordinance and found that the collection of 
broad swaths of data absent reasonable suspicion would likely violate the 
Fourth Amendment.71  New York City is currently appealing that order 
before the Second Circuit.72  The result of the lawsuit could have implications 
not only for the city, but also for any municipality seeking data from private 
companies to help enforce administrative laws. 
E.  Data Sharing in Other Cities 
This is not the first time that a city has elicited information from home 
sharing services to help with law enforcement; it is only the first time that a 
city has gone about it in this specific way. 
In New Orleans, for example, hosts are required to obtain short-term rental 
licenses from the city.73  Airbnb shares a log of its hosts’ anonymized activity 
with the city on a monthly basis in accordance with a local statute, and the 
city can subpoena personal host information when it has a reasonable belief 
that a specific short-term rental is operating illegally.74  In contrast to New 
York City, there is no outright ban on short-term rentals in New Orleans.75  
Instead, there is a ninety-day annual cap for hosts to rent out entire homes in 
residential districts.76 
Several other cities have developed approaches to regulate this market.  
Chicago requires home sharing platforms to register each listed unit with the 
city.77  Home sharing platforms must provide anonymized data on users and 
lengths of stay on a bimonthly basis, with the caveat that personalized 
information will be provided upon request by subpoena if illegal activity is 
suspected.78  Chicago does not have laws banning short-term rentals, but it 
 
 69. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 
13, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 
WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Airbnb Memo in Support]. 
 70. See Airbnb Complaint, supra note 12, at 5–6; HomeAway Complaint, supra note 68, 
at 5.  The lawsuits also allege violations of the First Amendment and the New York State 
Constitution, but those claims are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 71. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 91990, at *20. 
 72. Joyce Hanson, NYC Taking Short-Term Rental Rule’s Freeze to 2nd Circ., LAW360 
(Feb. 1, 2019, 3:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/1124566/nyc-taking-
short-term-rental-rule-s-freeze-to-2nd-circ- [https://perma.cc/SBL9-5BL9]. 
 73. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-613(b) (2019). 
 74. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-620(a)–(b) (2019). 
 75. Short Term Rental Zoning Restrictions, CITY NEW ORLEANS, https://www.nola.gov/ 
short-term-rentals/str-zoning-restrictions/ [https://perma.cc/BP3Q-NLWZ] (last updated May 
24, 2018). 
 76. NEW ORLEANS, LA., COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE § 21.8.C.14.b (2019). 
 77. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-14-020 (2018). 
 78. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-13-240 (2018). 
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allows individual precincts with residentially zoned areas to adopt local 
ordinances prohibiting additional short-term rentals.79  In Portland, short-
term rentals are allowed, provided that hosts live in their homes for at least 
nine months a year80 and obtain a permit from the city.81  San Francisco 
requires individuals to apply for an identifying number in the city’s short-
term rental registry82 and submit quarterly reports of activity.83  San 
Francisco does not require Airbnb to regularly share data, but it does have 
laws specifying that home sharing platforms must maintain personalized host 
data for three years and provide it to the city in response to a lawful request.84 
These policies illustrate a willingness to accommodate the reality of 
Airbnb’s popularity by refraining from banning short-term rentals of 
residential apartments while maintaining some limits on and oversight of the 
industry. 
II.  THE PRIVACY CONCERNS IMPLICATED BY LOCAL LAW 146 
This Part discusses several distinct privacy questions that Local Law 146 
raises, including whether the law constitutes an illegal Fourth Amendment 
administrative search, how the third-party doctrine affects a party’s ability to 
successfully challenge the law, whether the law is preempted by the Stored 
Communications Act, and whether the law offends traditional notions of 
privacy in the home.  These concerns provide the background for Airbnb and 
HomeAway’s challenges to Local Law 146. 
A.  Fourth Amendment Administrative Search 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause.”85  Generally, a government search requires a court-
issued warrant, and this warrant requirement guarantees a legal justification 
for the search.86  Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable” aside from 
“a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”87 
Fourth Amendment protection extends to areas in which a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, as Justice John Marshall Harlan discussed 
in his influential concurring opinion in Katz v. United States.88  This 
expectation is twofold:  “[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
 
 79. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-17-020 (2018). 
 80. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE & CHARTER § 33-207-040(A)(1) (2018). 
 81. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE & CHARTER § 33-207-040(C) (2018). 
 82. S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 41A.5(g)(1)(E)–(F) (2019). 
 83. S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 41A.5(g)(3)(C) (2019). 
 84. S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 41A.5(g)(4)(E) (2019). 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 86. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948). 
 87. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 88. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”89  In Katz, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated when law enforcement officers recorded his phone calls from 
a telephone booth90 without a warrant.91  Despite the semi-public nature of 
the phone booth, the defendant could reasonably expect that his calls were 
private.92 
However, warrantless searches are sometimes allowed where 
“special needs . . . make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable”93 or the primary purpose of the search is “distinguishable 
from the general interest in crime control.”94  Special needs searches directed 
toward a purpose other than crime control—usually compliance with health 
and safety regulations—are known as administrative searches.95 
The administrative search doctrine originated in the 1967 Supreme Court 
decision Camara v. Municipal Court.96  In Camara, the Court found that a 
San Francisco ordinance authorizing building inspectors to determine 
compliance with the housing code would be permissible only if there was a 
reasonable government interest97 that was balanced against the invasion of a 
citizen’s privacy.98  In the case of the building-inspection regime, citizens 
could either consent to a search (the majority response), or, in the absence of 
consent, inspectors could obtain a warrant.99  While a search warrant can 
generally only be obtained by showing probable cause that evidence is 
located in a particular place,100 the Court determined that an administrative 
search warrant could properly be issued without reasonable suspicion if the 
criteria for inspection are set out in legislative standards.101  For a building 
inspection, these standards may include the passage of time, the nature of the 
building, or the condition of the entire area.102 
Since Camara, warrantless administrative searches have proliferated.  
Common forms of administrative searches include familiar processes such as 
checkpoint vehicle searches103 and inspections of businesses in particular 
industries.104 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 353 (majority opinion). 
 91. Id. at 356–58. 
 92. Id. at 352–53. 
 93. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 
 94. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)). 
 95. See G. S. Hans, Curing Administrative Search Decay, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 3 
(2018). 
 96. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 97. Id. at 539. 
 98. Id. at 537. 
 99. Id. at 539–40. 
 100. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). 
 101. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). 
 104. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 311–13 (1972). 
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In addition, certain “closely regulated industries”105 are considered so 
hazardous to the public welfare that proprietors within these fields have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.106  There are, to date, only four industries 
that the Supreme Court has deemed closely regulated:  liquor sales,107 
firearms dealing,108 mining,109 and running automobile junkyards.110 
Outside of closely regulated industries, the Court has held that absent 
consent or exigent circumstances, the subject of an administrative search 
“must be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a 
neutral decisionmaker.”111  For example, if records are subpoenaed, the 
subject of the subpoena has the opportunity to “question the reasonableness 
of the subpoena” in court.112 
In support of its position that Local Law 146 constitutes an illegal Fourth 
Amendment administrative search, Airbnb relies heavily on the 2015 
Supreme Court decision City of Los Angeles v. Patel,113 in which the Court 
struck down a city ordinance requiring hotel operators to immediately turn 
over their records to the police on command and with no opportunity for 
precompliance review under the administrative search doctrine.114  In Patel, 
the Court held that it is unconstitutional to penalize a hotel owner who refuses 
to give police officers access to his or her registry on the spot and with no 
prior notice because the owner has not been given an opportunity to have a 
neutral decision maker review the demand.115  The Court also held that hotels 
are not a closely regulated industry under administrative search 
jurisprudence:  “[C]lassify[ing] hotels as pervasively regulated would permit 
what has always been a narrow exception to swallow the rule.”116 
Due to certain parallels with Airbnb’s lawsuit—the context of the 
hospitality industry, the search involving customer records, and the apparent 
lack of opportunity for precompliance review—Patel looms large in the 
dispute over Local Law 146. 
B.  Third-Party Issues 
This section discusses whose rights courts will recognize when the 
government gains information about an individual through a search of a third-
party entity.  First, this section traces the evolution of the third-party doctrine 
and explains how the doctrine affects which parties can bring meritorious 
 
 105. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015). 
 106. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978). 
 107. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 74 (1970). 
 108. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316. 
 109. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981). 
 110. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 707 (1987). 
 111. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015). 
 112. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984). 
 113. 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015). 
 114. See id. at 2456; Airbnb Complaint, supra note 12, at 23 
 115. See Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2447, 2453.  While it is not necessary that the demand actually 
be reviewed if the hotel owner gives consent, if the owner refuses consent, she must be 
afforded the opportunity to object. See id. at 2453. 
 116. Id. at 2455. 
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challenges to Local Law 146.  Second, this section explains the distinct 
theory of third-party standing. 
1.  History of the Third-Party Doctrine 
In an administrative search challenge, the complainant typically must be 
the business that was subject to the administrative search rather than an 
individual whose records were produced as a result of the search.117  This is 
due to the third-party doctrine, under which individual citizens do not have a 
protected privacy interest in records that are given to and controlled by a third 
party.118  This notion is rooted in Katz, which established that Fourth 
Amendment protection extends to areas where a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy but that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”119  Another key component of the third-party doctrine is that the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from obtaining 
information that a person has revealed to a third party, “even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a 
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed.”120  As a result, the government can usually obtain information 
provided by citizens to third parties without triggering Fourth Amendment 
protections by serving legal process on the third party.121 
Following its rudimentary origins in Katz, the third-party doctrine was 
solidified in two 1970s cases:  United States v. Miller,122 in which the 
Supreme Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank 
records;123 and Smith v. Maryland,124 in which the Court held that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on a phone.125 
More recently, the Court considered the limits of the third-party doctrine 
in Carpenter v. United States,126 a case involving historical cell-site location 
information (CSLI) subpoenaed as a part of a robbery investigation.127  The 
Court found that the defendant Timothy Carpenter had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his CSLI, despite the fact that the information was 
created, stored, and controlled by his cell phone company—a third party.128  
The Court found the third-party doctrine inapplicable in this case because 
Carpenter did not voluntarily share his location information with the cell 
 
 117. See Hans, supra note 95, at 10–11. 
 118. Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 
100 MINN. L. REV. 985, 985 (2016). 
 119. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 120. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 121. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018). 
 122. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 123. See id. at 442–43. 
 124. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 125. Id. at 743–44. 
 126. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 127. See id. at 2210. 
 128. See id. at 2217. 
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phone company and because of the comprehensive and especially revealing 
nature of CSLI.129  Some scholars have predicted that this decision will have 
a ripple effect and will make it more difficult for the government to access 
various types of nonpublic databases.130 
The Court split 5-4 with the dissenting justices authoring four separate 
dissents.131  Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissent, joined by Justice Thomas 
and Justice Alito,132 emphasized that property concepts are still integral to 
Fourth Amendment rights.133  Because the bank in Miller and the phone 
company in Smith were more than merely “bailees or custodians of the 
records, with a duty to hold the records for the defendants’ use,” individuals 
could not argue that their own personal property had been searched.134  
Justice Kennedy found nothing special to distinguish CSLI from other 
records that contain personal information but are nonetheless owned by 
businesses and can be obtained through serving a subpoena on the 
business.135 
In a separate dissent, Justice Alito emphasized that the majority decision 
“fractures two fundamental pillars of Fourth Amendment law” by treating an 
order to produce specified documents as equivalent to a search, and by 
allowing a defendant to object to the search of a third party’s property.136  
Justice Alito warned that this would threaten legitimate investigative 
practices on which law enforcement officers rely.137  By contrast, Justice 
Gorsuch was the only dissenting vote to argue for greater individual privacy 
protections than the majority and wholesale abandonment of the third-party 
doctrine.138 
While the implications of Carpenter are not yet fully understood, the 
decision shows that the Court is rethinking strict application of the third-party 
doctrine.139  This rethinking is important in the Airbnb context because the 
classic application of the third-party doctrine would prevent individual hosts 
from claiming a violation of their privacy rights following a search of 
Airbnb’s records. 
2.  Third-Party Standing 
Third-party standing is an exception to the rule that a “plaintiff generally 
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to 
 
 129. See id. at 2223. 
 130. See Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle:  A Near Perfect 
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 206 (2018). 
 131. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 132. Id. at 2223. 
 133. Id. at 2227–28. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 2228. 
 135. See id. at 2229. 
 136. Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 139. See Jordan M. Blanke, Carpenter v. United States Begs for Action, 2018 U. ILL. L. 
REV. ONLINE 260, 260. 
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relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”140  In certain situations, 
third-party plaintiffs can assert constitutional arguments on behalf of 
nonparties, provided that there is:  (1) a close relationship between the 
plaintiff and the parties possessing the right; and (2) some hindrance to the 
nonparty bringing a claim of his own.141  This exception gives standing to 
businesses to bring constitutional claims on behalf of their clients and 
customers.  For example, in Craig v. Boren,142 a licensed vendor of 3.2 
percent beer was allowed to assert an equal protection claim on behalf of 
male customers who were adversely affected by a law allowing women to 
purchase 3.2 percent beer at age eighteen and men at age twenty-one.143  In 
Recording Industry Ass’n of America v. Verizon Internet Services,144 Verizon 
was allowed to challenge a subpoena that sought the identity of a user on the 
grounds that the subpoena violated the user’s First Amendment rights.145  
Accordingly, third-party standing is an alternate theory under which home 
sharing services could assert the privacy rights of their customers. 
C.  The Stored Communications Act 
The Stored Communications Act (SCA)146 is a federal statutory 
framework that adds an extra layer of responsibility to covered entities in 
safeguarding their users’ electronic information and communications from 
disclosure.147  The law contains a sliding scale requiring greater protection 
for more sensitive types of information, such as the content of messages as 
opposed to a user’s basic registration information.148  The provisions of the 
statute articulating which entities the SCA covers are considered to be 
outdated.149  As written, the SCA covers electronic communications services 
(ECS), meaning “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to 
send or receive . . . electronic communications,”150 and remote computing 
services (RCS), meaning any entity engaged in the “provision to the public 
of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic 
communications system.”151 
Regarding the disclosure of information to the government, the SCA 
provides that “a provider of remote computing service or electronic 
 
 140. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
 141. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004). 
 142. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 143. See id. at 192–93. 
 144. 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 145. See id. at 258. 
 146. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2012). 
 147. See In re United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), 289 F. Supp. 3d 
201, 203 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 148. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1222 (2004). 
 149. Id. at 1213; cf. In re United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), 289 
F. Supp. 3d at 208 (“With technological advances since the enactment of . . . the SCA, the 
difference between ECS and RCS has eroded . . . .”). 
 150. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012). 
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communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or 
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . 
to any governmental entity” without a subpoena or other legal process.152  
The flip side is that the law requires an internet service provider to disclose 
electronic information protected by the Act to the government if the 
government obtains legal process in a form approved by the Act.153 
Section 2703 of the SCA discusses customer records.154  The provision 
says that the government can use an administrative subpoena authorized by 
federal or state statute to compel disclosure of basic customer records 
including customer identity and the types of services used.155  For all other 
customer records, the government must either obtain a warrant, a court order, 
or the consent of the customer.156  Local Law 146 potentially implicates this 
provision. 
D.  The Home and Privacy 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[W]hen it comes to the Fourth 
Amendment, the home is first among equals.  At the Amendment’s ‘very 
core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable government intrusion.’”157  Indeed, “the overriding 
respect for the sanctity of the home . . . has been embedded in our traditions 
since the origins of the Republic.”158 
The special consideration historically given to the home and overnight 
lodging are not directly asserted by Airbnb, likely because the privacy of the 
home is not directly implicated by Local Law 146, and Airbnb is not a private 
citizen with a home.  But while this privacy concern is not currently being 
litigated, it is an undercurrent of the dispute.  Local Law 146 does not directly 
authorize any home searches—rather, the law directs the disclosure of 
customer records.159  However, these records contain information regarding 
the physical homes of New York City residents, in addition to the arguably 
commercial activity that periodically goes on within them.  In November 
2018, a team of twenty law enforcement officers descended on a 
condominium tower in Manhattan and issued violations to twenty different 
owners, which illustrates how the information contained in the reports 
mandated by Local Law 146 could lead to more physical searches of 
homes.160 
 
 152. Id. § 2702(a)(3). 
 153. See id. § 2703(b). 
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City council members have responded to blowback against regulation of 
Airbnb by claiming that the city has no interest in targeting individual 
middle- or low-income homeowners who rent out their homes occasionally 
for extra income and that, instead, the city is focused on eliminating operators 
of de facto illegal hotels with multiple listings.161  But the language imposing 
fines for violations of the short-term rental laws makes no distinction 
between the two,162 and anecdotal evidence shows the city is not only 
targeting large-scale operators.163  Despite the promises of city officials, 
Local Law 146 and New York State’s short-term rental laws apply to all New 
York City residents, regardless of the scale at which they operate on 
Airbnb.164  The proximity of Local Law 146 to the home could further 
complicate privacy considerations. 
III.  THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK’S ASSESSMENT OF THE 
PRIVACY ARGUMENTS AGAINST LOCAL LAW 146 
This Part lays out the privacy arguments that Airbnb and HomeAway 
assert in their lawsuits against New York City and explains the district court’s 
reasons for its preliminary ruling against the city.  First, this Part addresses 
the argument that the law creates an illegal Fourth Amendment 
administrative search; second, it explains the different approaches that 
Airbnb and HomeAway took in addressing the third-party issues; and third, 
it discusses the argument that the law violates the Stored Communications 
Act. 
A.  Fourth Amendment Administrative Search 
In its lawsuit, Airbnb claims that Local Law 146 is facially invalid because 
it requires Airbnb to surrender information to the government with no 
opportunity for precompliance review.165  Airbnb argues that “a company’s 
common law possessory interest in its own records would have ‘little 
practical value’ if the government could commandeer them at will.”166  
Airbnb argues that it does not fall into the limited category of closely 
regulated industries for which administrative searches are conducted in the 
regular course of business, as it is not involved in alcohol or firearm sales, 
mining, or automobile junkyards.167  Furthermore, City of Los Angeles v. 
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Patel explicitly clarified that the hotel industry is not closely regulated;168 
therefore, even though home sharing platforms are not exactly the same as 
hotels, Airbnb suggests that Patel’s holding weighs in favor of finding that 
home sharing is also not a closely regulated industry.  As Airbnb argues, 
“there is no reason to believe that home sharing platforms pose a ‘clear and 
significant risk to the public welfare’ or are ‘intrinsically dangerous.’”169  
Airbnb also claims that the provision requiring it to obtain its users’ 
“consent” before giving over their information should not alter the analysis 
because “the government cannot condition the use of private property on a 
compelled waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.”170 
In response, the City of New York claims that Airbnb is attempting to stand 
in the shoes of its hosts and does not have standing to assert claims on behalf 
of the hosts.171  The city does not argue that home sharing should be regarded 
as a “closely regulated industry,” but instead suggests that Local Law 146 
does not implicate Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment rights because Airbnb lacks 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in records of rental transactions 
belonging to its hosts.172  It asserts that the opportunity for precompliance 
review deemed necessary in Patel is therefore unnecessary.173  The city also 
argues that Local Law 146’s consent provision—which requires Airbnb hosts 
to consent to this disclosure before using the service—is adequate legal 
consent.174  If Patel does apply, the city argues that Airbnb’s lawsuit itself 
could be deemed to constitute precompliance review as “the Court has never 
attempted to prescribe the exact form an opportunity for precompliance 
review must take.”175 
In an opinion and order granting Airbnb and HomeAway’s request for a 
preliminary injunction, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer found that Local Law 146 
is likely unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment:  “Existing Fourth 
Amendment law does not afford a charter for such a wholesale regulatory 
appropriation of a company’s user database.”176  The opinion warned that 
“[a] ruling upholding the Ordinance as reasonable would invite 
municipalities to make similar demands on e-commerce companies . . . for 
the routinized production to investigative agencies of broad-ranging 
records.”177  Illustrating potentially troubling scenarios that endorsement of 
this law could lead to, the court explained that by similar logic, the city 
council could compel online auction services to produce records of all sales 
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by New York City residents in order to root out evasions of capital gains 
taxes or compel medical providers to produce all patient records on a monthly 
basis to help identify “up-coding and other health-care fraud.”178 
According to the court, the city’s justification for its proposed collection 
of this data—facilitating OSE’s enforcement efforts—is not adequate.179  
The court opined that the history of OSE issuing subpoenas to Airbnb and 
HomeAway does not show that historical standards and investigative 
methods will necessarily be ineffectual.180  Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
“disdained justifications like that offered by the City”181 and has held that 
“the test of reasonableness is not whether an investigative practice maximizes 
law enforcement efficacy.”182  While granting that Local Law 146 would aid 
OSE in its mission to identify violators of the short-term rental laws, the court 
ultimately found no precedent supporting the conclusion that governmental 
appropriation of private business records on this scale, unsupported by 
individualized suspicion or any tailoring, qualifies as reasonable.183 
As a threshold matter, the court found that the Fourth Amendment does 
apply to Local Law 146184 and that Airbnb has a protectable privacy interest 
in the records that the law seeks as business records are covered under the 
“papers” category of the Fourth Amendment.185  Additionally, the court 
found that Patel foreclosed the city’s argument that Airbnb does not have a 
privacy interest because the records at issue belong to customers.186  In Patel, 
the data sought also originated with guests,187 but the Supreme Court 
recognized that the hotel owners had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the guests’ information, which was stored in the hotel’s records.188  The court 
noted that there are at least two reasons why businesses in the position of 
Airbnb or the hotel owners in Patel would seek to preserve the privacy of 
their customers’ information:  first, to protect the information from business 
competitors and, second, to foster the trust of customers.189  For these 
reasons, the court affirmed Patel’s assessment that customer-facing 
businesses are not expected to disclose commercially sensitive information 
such as customer lists and being compelled to do so is “more than sufficient 
to trigger Fourth Amendment protection.”190  While the parties spilled 
considerable ink discussing whose rights are at issue under Local Law 146, 
the court found the premise that Airbnb’s rights are implicated relatively 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *16–18. 
 180. Id. at *17. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at *18. 
 184. Id. at *9. 
 185. Id. at *10. 
 186. Id. 
 187. For example, the municipal regulation sought names, addresses, and vehicle 
information. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447–48 (2015). 
 188. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 91990, at *10. 
 189. Id. at *11. 
 190. Id. (quoting Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 738 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
2610 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
straightforward.191  However, it did not foreclose the possibility that host 
rights are implicated as well.192 
Although the city did not argue that home sharing should be deemed a 
closely regulated industry, the court clarified that it is not.193  The court found 
Patel’s reasoning that the hotel industry does not involve inherently 
dangerous operations or have a history of pervasive regulation to be 
persuasive, and it ultimately concluded that this “equally applies to the peer-
to-peer housing market.”194  Thus, Airbnb does not have a diminished 
privacy interest in its records by virtue of the nature of the business.195 
The court then evaluated the reasonableness of the search under two 
related lines of authority:  agency investigative subpoenas and administrative 
searches.196  Though the parties’ arguments had focused on administrative 
searches, the court found that in some ways Local Law 146 acts more like an 
agency subpoena in that it requires booking services to produce records to an 
agency rather than requiring any physical inspection.197  Ultimately, the two 
lines of authority led the court in a similar analytic direction as both require 
some form of tailored inspection or request to prevent fishing expeditions, as 
well as the opportunity of precompliance review before a neutral decision 
maker.198  The court found Local Law 146 lacked both of these important 
restraints.199 
On the subject of tailoring, the court noted that the scale of the information 
to be collected by the city under the ordinance is “breathtaking.”200  As an 
example, the court pointed out that in 2016, data from more than 700,000 
bookings would have been transmitted to the city under the ordinance.201  
“The universality of the Ordinance’s monthly production demand . . . , the 
sheer volume of guest records implicated, and the Ordinance’s infinite time 
horizon all disfavor the Ordinance when evaluated for reasonableness under 
the Fourth Amendment.”202  While an agency subpoena must “be sufficiently 
limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that 
compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome,”203 the court found that 
Local Law 146 is “the antithesis of a targeted administrative subpoena”204 
and “devoid of any tailoring.”205  The court found that the law amounts to 
“functional equivalent of a legislative edict mandating that OSE issue an 
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identical subpoena to every covered booking service operating in New York 
City, every month . . . and extending into perpetuity.”206  Demanding this 
information without any factual basis to suspect any particular host, in the 
court’s view, fails to meet the standard of specificity.207  Administrative 
searches must usually satisfy “a relaxed standard of probable cause.”208  The 
court acknowledged that some “suspicionless searches”209 have been upheld 
as administrative searches, but only in exigent circumstances not present 
here.210 
On the issue of precompliance review, the court also found Local Law 146 
deficient.211  The court relied on Patel and its recent affirmation that the 
subject of an administrative search must have an opportunity for 
precompliance review before a neutral decision maker prior to suffering 
penalties for refusing to comply.212  The court also found that the city failed 
to identify any mechanism for precompliance review under Local Law 146 
where a home sharing service could challenge either a demand for data or a 
penalty for noncompliance.213  Moreover, the court noted that the ordinance 
provides for penalties of up to $1500 per listing for failure to comply, which 
“could prove punishing, if not an existential threat, to a booking service.”214  
The court rejected the city’s theory that the instant lawsuit could be deemed 
precompliance review as the lawsuit only constituted a facial challenge to 
Local Law 146 and could not substitute for a challenge to any particular 
application of the ordinance.215  While Local Law 146 functions in a manner 
distinct from the ordinance at issue in Patel, and does not involve in-person 
inspections, the need for precompliance review is the same. 
Ultimately, the court’s determination that Local Law 146 likely violates 
the Fourth Amendment was based “most notably, [on] the scale of the user 
data compelled to be produced, as measured against the precedents that 
require that the demands of subpoenas and regulatory searches and seizures 
be reasonably tailored and that reject governmental attempts to dispense with 
tailoring in the generalized interest of investigative efficacy.”216  Further, the 
court emphasized that Fourth Amendment violation was aggravated “because 
(1) the user data in question is commercially sensitive and subject to potential 
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disclosure; and (2) the Ordinance’s requirement for monthly productions of 
such data is perpetual.”217  Thus, while the lack of opportunity for 
precompliance review is important, amending that aspect of the ordinance 
would not necessarily salvage the constitutionality of the city’s law. 
B.  Third-Party Issues 
In their separate court filings, Airbnb and HomeAway take two different 
approaches to the issue of the third-party doctrine.  Airbnb does not 
specifically allude to the third-party doctrine and frames its argument as an 
assertion of only its own Fourth Amendment rights, though it references its 
concern for its hosts’ privacy.218  Conversely, HomeAway directly argues 
that it should be able to sue on behalf of its hosts under the doctrine of third-
party standing.219 
In its lawsuit, Airbnb sometimes conflates the concepts of its own privacy 
with its customers’ privacy, for example, by asserting that Local Law 146 
“requires Airbnb to report on a monthly basis volumes of otherwise private 
information about who New Yorkers choose to invite into their homes, where 
those homes are located, when and for how long the guests stay, and what 
the guests are doing there.”220  While Airbnb embeds its arguments in themes 
of a personal privacy violation and ostensibly piggybacks on the more 
personal violation its customers would experience, it ultimately argues that 
the records at issue are its own regardless of “whether the information 
originally comes from users (as was true of the guest book in Patel).”221  
Airbnb argues that the relevant Fourth Amendment questions are “whether 
the requested information is in Airbnb’s possession and whether Airbnb 
maintains it as private.”222 
HomeAway argues that Local Law 146 violates both its Fourth 
Amendment rights223 and the rights of its customers.224  In support of its right 
to assert claims on behalf of its customers, HomeAway argues that it has 
third-party standing because it has a close relationship to its customers and 
because there is a hindrance to the customers’ ability to protect their own 
interests.225  Specifically, HomeAway claims that its customers would be 
overly burdened by the economic realities of litigation and would face the 
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possibility of retribution from the city.226  Moreover, it argues that the case 
for third-party standing is particularly compelling where personal privacy 
rights are involved.227 
The city claims that the home sharing services lack standing to assert 
privacy claims on behalf of their hosts due to the general principle that Fourth 
Amendment rights are personal rights and cannot be vicariously asserted.228  
It argues that third-party standing is inappropriate under the three-part test 
from Powers v. Ohio229:  “(i) ‘[t]he litigant must have suffered an “injury in 
fact”’; (ii) ‘the litigant must have a close relation to the third party’; and (iii) 
‘there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or 
her own interests.’”230  While home sharing services might meet the second 
prong by having a close relationship with their users, the city argues that the 
plaintiffs have failed to show an injury to themselves or a legitimate reason 
that hosts are hindered from asserting their own privacy rights.231  
Furthermore, the city argues that HomeAway’s host-based claims would fail 
anyway because hosts lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information requested under the third-party doctrine,232 as they have 
voluntarily turned the information over to the home sharing services233 and 
have already consented to the disclosure of information.234 
Largely ignoring the lengthy discussion of standing in the parties’ briefs 
and the differing approaches taken by Airbnb and HomeAway, Judge 
Engelmayer chose only to address arguments regarding the rights of home 
sharing services rather than the rights of hosts.235  As discussed in Part III.A, 
the court determined that the Fourth Amendment rights of home sharing 
services are implicated by Local Law 146, as the statute seeks to compel 
production of their business records.236 
Rather than responding to HomeAway’s theory of third-party standing, the 
court placed this comment in a footnote:  “Airbnb and HomeAway base their 
challenges to the Ordinance solely on the claim that their Fourth Amendment 
rights . . . would be abridged.  The Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis 
accordingly focuses solely on the claim that the Ordinance impairs the rights 
of the platforms.”237  It is unclear why the court took this relatively simplistic 
view of the standing arguments despite language in HomeAway’s complaint 
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and memorandum in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction 
directly asking for relief on behalf of its customers.238  Perhaps the court 
intended to avoid the complex constitutional question of whether a third-
party business can assert Fourth Amendment constitutional claims on behalf 
of customers, given that the lawsuit can be decided without this specific 
argument. 
However, the court hinted that it remains open to a Fourth Amendment 
challenge by an individual, notwithstanding traditional third-party doctrine 
concerns.  In the same footnote, the court wrote, “in theory a user could have 
brought a Fourth Amendment claim of his or her own, presumably attempting 
to extend the principles of Carpenter to this context.”239  While only 
mentioned briefly, this footnote shows the court acknowledging that Local 
Law 146 also implicates hosts’ rights.  Moreover, following Carpenter, the 
court implies that there may be flexibility to argue that these individual 
privacy rights deserve Fourth Amendment protection despite the fact that the 
hosts shared their information with a third-party and thus can have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the classic application of Smith and 
Miller.240 
C.  The Stored Communications Act 
Finally, Airbnb argues that the Stored Communications Act preempts 
Local Law 146241 and that the company would violate federal law were it to 
comply with the ordinance because it requires the company to turn over user 
information without either a subpoena or valid user consent.242  Airbnb 
claims that it could be liable to hosts if it turns over their information.243 
While the SCA provides that the government can legally obtain 
information covered under the Act via the consent of the subscriber or 
customer,244 Airbnb argues that the provision of Local Law 146 requiring it 
to obtain disclosure consent from its users is insufficient for two reasons.  
First, it argues that the SCA requires the governmental entity itself to obtain 
user consent rather than the service provider.245  Second, it argues that the 
consent obtained by Airbnb would be invalid since the “consent” is forced 
and that allowing the government to mandate that covered entities obtain 
consent from users to disclose their information undermines the concept of 
consent set forth in the SCA.246  Illustrating its point, Airbnb claims that “if 
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the City’s position were accepted, it is not clear why the City could not, for 
example, require Amazon or any other online platform to obtain blanket 
‘consent’ from its customers and then turn over details of their purchases or 
other online activity.”247 
In response, the city claims that Local Law 146 does not conflict with the 
SCA because the SCA does not protect communications that are readily 
accessible to the public,248 not all booking services are covered by the 
SCA,249 the consent provision of Local Law 146 makes it legal under the 
SCA,250 consent is not forced,251 and the SCA does not require governmental 
entities to obtain consent directly from the subscriber.252 
In its preliminary injunction, the court found that the home sharing sites’ 
argument that Local Law 146 is preempted by the SCA was “colorable” but 
declined to say whether the argument was likely to succeed.253  While 
portions of a similar home sharing data-collection law were found to be 
preempted by the SCA in a previous case, Homeaway.com, Inc. v. City of 
Portland,254 the court distinguished Local Law 146 on the basis of its consent 
provision, which requires the home sharing sites to obtain the consent of a 
user to the disclosure of their information before they can use the service.255  
Despite the home sharing sites’ argument that this consent would be invalid 
because it is forced, the court found that the plaintiffs had not proved that 
hosts would feel coerced to consent.256  Additionally, the court found 
relevant the fact that both Airbnb and HomeAway’s current privacy policies 
already require hosts to consent to disclosure of their information to legal 
authorities when reasonably necessary.257  The court did not acknowledge 
that the implications of this consent would drastically change if Local 
Law 146 goes into effect.  The court was also unpersuaded by Airbnb’s 
stance that the SCA requires the government to obtain consent directly from 
users rather than through an intermediary.258  Ultimately, the court neither 
favored Airbnb’s SCA preemption argument at the preliminary stage nor did 
it foreclose the possibility that it would be successful on a fully developed 
record.259 
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IV.  THE UNANSWERED QUESTION OF INDIVIDUAL CHALLENGES 
TO LOCAL LAW 146 
This Part explores the possibility of individual hosts bringing as-applied 
challenges to Local Law 146 or to similar statutes in the future.260  Could an 
individual plaintiff challenging this type of search provide a compelling 
justification for long-simmering change to the third-party doctrine? 
A.  Why Individuals Should Be Able to Challenge Data-Collection Laws 
When the Second Circuit rules on the preliminary injunction in Airbnb, 
Inc. v. City of New York,261 it will only resolve the question of Airbnb’s 
Fourth Amendment right as a business to be free from this attempted 
administrative search.  If the district court’s decision is affirmed, Airbnb 
hosts will have been protected from these searches by a corporate proxy 
whose interests happen to be closely aligned with their own.262  However, if 
the decision is reversed, every single Airbnb host in New York City could 
soon see their home sharing records turned over to the city and be subject to 
fines if they are found to be renting their home for fewer than thirty days.263  
If Airbnb cannot successfully challenge the constitutionality of this search, 
would the third-party doctrine prevent hosts themselves from doing so?  
Given that hosts are the ultimate targets of the city’s investigative efforts, this 
result seems unjust.  The following sections discuss how hosts might attempt 
to bring a challenge. 
B.  Third-Party Doctrine Issues 
The first hurdle that individuals must surmount is the third-party doctrine.  
Prior to Carpenter, the idea that individuals could be successful plaintiffs in 
a privacy challenge to Local Law 146 would have seemed misguided since 
Airbnb hosts voluntarily handed their information over to Airbnb and 
therefore could not be said to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
information under Smith and Miller.264  This case would be a classic example 
of a challenge easily defeated by the third-party doctrine.265  Indeed, several 
months prior to the Carpenter decision, a California state court rejected a 
similar argument made by HomeAway on behalf of its customers.266 
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But Carpenter opened up the possibility that the Supreme Court may be 
willing to question the wisdom of the third-party doctrine in the digital age, 
as it is nearly impossible to function in today’s society without sharing 
information digitally.  The Carpenter Court found that the third-party 
doctrine did not apply to CSLI because the information was too 
comprehensive and was not voluntarily shared in the literal sense.267  Justice 
Gorsuch, in dissent, leaned even further toward protecting consumer privacy 
and argued that the Court should not sidestep the third-party doctrine but 
should instead rethink the doctrine completely268:  “Just because you have to 
entrust a third party with your data doesn’t necessarily mean you should lose 
all Fourth Amendment protections in it.”269 
This skepticism of the third-party doctrine is not new.  Professor Orin Kerr 
has explained that “the verdict among commentators has been frequent and 
apparently unanimous:  The third-party doctrine is not only wrong, but 
horribly wrong.”270  In United States v. Jones,271 Justice Sotomayor wrote a 
concurring opinion that questioned the third-party doctrine in its entirety: 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties. . . .  I would not assume that all information voluntarily 
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that 
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.272 
Despite this sentiment, Sotomayor joined Carpenter majority’s opinion, 
which preserved the third-party doctrine and created a limited exception for 
CSLI.273  The Carpenter majority did not hint at what types of personal data 
held by third parties might also skirt the traditional third-party doctrine, and 
Justice Alito, in dissent, fretted that this uncertainty would guarantee a 
“blizzard of litigation.”274  Against this background, Carpenter could be 
regarded as the first major crack in the third-party doctrine, and likely not the 
last. 
The third-party doctrine carveout created in Carpenter dictates that 
obtaining an individual’s personal CSLI constitutes a search implicating the 
person’s Fourth Amendment rights, even though the information was 
arguably “shared” with a third party.275  Investigators must obtain a warrant 
before accessing a wireless customer’s CSLI276 rather than merely a court 
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order as the investigators did in the case.277  Careful not to seismically disrupt 
the Fourth Amendment landscape, the Court wrote that “[t]he Government 
will be able to use subpoenas to acquire records in the overwhelming 
majority of investigations . . . .  [A] warrant is required in the rare case where 
the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third 
party.”278  The Court found that individuals have a legitimate privacy interest 
in their personal CSLI due to its “deeply revealing nature . . . , its depth, 
breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature 
of its collection.”279 
As the majority of the Court does not appear ready for an all-out challenge 
to the third-party doctrine, individuals fighting Local Law 146 would do 
better to argue for an exception to the doctrine similar to that recognized in 
Carpenter.  Home sharing records may not be as frighteningly invasive as 
CSLI, but the way in which the city plans to use these records presents its 
own undesirable consequences that the Supreme Court may not have 
intended when it created the third-party doctrine. 
C.  The Dangerous Combination of the Third-Party Doctrine 
and Data-Collection Laws 
Though, with the exception of Carpenter, the Supreme Court has 
consistently upheld the third-party doctrine in the context of criminal 
investigations, it has never blessed the combination of the third-party 
doctrine and an administrative search regime.280  As Professor Adam 
Lamparello has explained, “Together, the third-party doctrine and 
administrative search exception can easily become a one-two punch that 
strikes a significant blow at the heart of basic privacy protections.”281  This 
is especially true in the context of data-collection laws, which can amass a 
large volume of information about individuals who were not previously 
suspected of any legal violation, with little effort by the government. 
Several differences in procedure distinguish the situation Timothy 
Carpenter faced from the situation individuals will face under Local Law 
146.  Carpenter’s CSLI records were obtained via subpoena as part of a 
criminal investigation in which he had been identified as a suspect.282  At 
trial, he moved to suppress the records for having been obtained without a 
warrant.283  In contrast, Airbnb and its customers readily admit that host 
records can be subpoenaed through Airbnb as part of an investigation,284 but 
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they object to the fact that, under Local Law 146, the extra step of obtaining 
a court-ordered subpoena is skipped over.  Individuals searched under Local 
Law 146 will be searched regardless of individualized suspicion since, in an 
administrative search regime, the criteria necessary for a search are provided 
by statute.285  Hosts could argue that, notwithstanding the government’s 
ability to subpoena their records from Airbnb, a data-collection statute that 
takes the form of a monthly dragnet implicates the Fourth Amendment rights 
of individuals whose data is collected.286 
The fact that Local Law 146 authorizes an automatic administrative search 
rather than an optional law enforcement tool is also significant.  While the 
threat of a subpoena represents a possibility that records may be searched 
following approval by court order, pursuant to the needs of a specific 
investigation, data-collection statutes like Local Law 146 create a certainty 
that customer records will be searched without being relevant to a particular 
investigation.  Even the administrative search regime at issue in Patel 
authorized searches of hotel records only when demanded by police, but it 
did not require all of the data to be turned over to the government on a set 
timetable.287  Hosts could argue that this more powerful and pervasive form 
of search necessitates greater protections for searched individuals. 
Additionally, under Local Law 146, not only is the search automatized, but 
so is the penalty.  If the reports provided by Airbnb reveal that a property has 
been rented for less than thirty days, this evidence could be enough to impose 
a fine automatically.  Though it has not been stated by the OSE directly, 
Local Law 146 will not likely be used to procure individual search warrants 
based on the data—more logically, it will cut out the need for physical 
inspections entirely. 
The city currently handles violations of the short-term rental and short-
term advertising laws through the New York City Office of Administrative 
Trials & Hearings (OATH).288  An alleged violator receives a summons with 
the proposed penalty and an optional hearing date.289  As with a parking 
ticket, the recipient can pay the fine by mail or contest the charge in an 
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informal hearing.290  Aside from the capacity of OATH to handle this volume 
of summonses, there is no apparent bar to the city transferring Airbnb user 
information directly to a summons if the report shows that user to have rented 
a property for fewer than thirty days or advertised a rental of fewer than thirty 
days.  Granted, this less formal adjudication stems from the fact that the 
short-term rental laws only carry the possibility of civil rather than criminal 
penalties—but the lesser procedural protections for individuals are still 
striking.  Automatic data collection combined with these swift and 
mechanized penalties could spur a reexamination of the rights at issue, as it 
seems particularly harsh to deny Fourth Amendment rights to individuals 
who lack other procedural protections. 
D.  The Home and Privacy 
Another aggravating element of Local Law 146 that hosts are better 
positioned to highlight than Airbnb is that broad data-collection statutes are 
especially improper in the context of the home.291  The specific data that New 
York City seeks to collect represents activity within private homes.292  Some 
of these details are arguably quite personal, such as the decision to 
periodically open space in the home to paying guests and the number of days 
that a resident is away from home each month.293 
Throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the privacy of the home 
has been zealously guarded.  Private dwellings are “ordinarily afforded the 
most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.”294  For a search of a private 
home, “a warrant traditionally has been required.”295  The interior of a home 
is “the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected 
privacy.”296  The reasonableness of the minimal expectation of privacy that 
exists in the home has deep roots in the common law.297  The Court has 
acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment draws “a firm line at the entrance 
to the house.”298  The Court also has held that guests have protectable Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights in hotel rooms299 and that overnight guests share 
the same expectation of privacy in their hosts’ homes.300 
While special protections for the home were once based on common-law 
trespass,301 a physical intrusion into the home is no longer necessary in order 
for a Fourth Amendment search to occur following Katz.302  In Kyllo v. 
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United States,303 investigators used thermal imaging technology to detect the 
presence of high-intensity lamps being used to grow marijuana in the 
defendant’s home.304  The Supreme Court held that when “the Government 
uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home 
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant.”305  While data disclosures from home sharing sites are distant in 
nature from thermal imaging technology, the analogy may not be so far-
fetched.  Both are law enforcement devices not in general public use that are 
being used to explore otherwise unknowable details of a home.  Furthermore, 
Kyllo held that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never 
been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information 
obtained.”306 
In Smith, the Supreme Court considered concerns about home privacy in 
the context of the third-party doctrine.307  The Court ruled that information 
voluntarily revealed to a third party, even within the context of the home, 
such as dialing numbers on a personal home phone, triggers the third-party 
doctrine, which means that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in this information.308  And without a reasonable expectation of privacy, no 
search occurs when law enforcement accesses this information.309  However, 
Smith involved the investigation of one specific crime and the installation of 
a pen register on one citizen’s phone.310  Thus, as discussed, it is 
distinguishable on the basis that it did not involve mass data collection 
without individualized suspicion. 
As the district court determined, under Local Law 146, neither hosts nor 
Airbnb have the opportunity to obtain precompliance review of document 
requests.311  The absence of an opportunity to obtain precompliance review 
indicates that home sharing is being treated as a closely regulated industry.312  
This absence further implies that home sharing is not just a business—but a 
business that is extremely hazardous to the public welfare.313  While it is 
indisputable that home sharing is a business that generates profits for 
individuals, it is also indisputable that home sharing creates a hybrid between 
a home and a business.314  Hosts could argue that their homes should still be 
regarded as homes, even if they are periodically rented out, and that the act 
of listing a private dwelling on Airbnb should not mean that a person 
automatically waives special protections usually afforded to the home.  At 
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the very least, it should not automatically subject that home to a rare form of 
automatic search. 
A challenge by hosts would depend on reconsideration of the third-party 
doctrine,315 with special urgency generated by present circumstances.  Local 
Law 146 involves (1) mandatory consent to disclosure as a prerequisite to 
using a commercial service,316 (2) governmental access to comprehensive 
private business records on a monthly basis in perpetuity,317 (3) the 
government learning information about private homes through these 
records,318 and (4) the government’s use of this information to impose 
automatic fines.319  Accordingly, this law enables the government to conduct 
invasive searches that are certain to affect thousands of individuals.  Further, 
the third-party doctrine denies these individuals Fourth Amendment rights 
that would provide grounds to challenge these searches, thereby allowing 
unreasonable searches to go unchecked.  While Airbnb and HomeAway may 
be effective proxies for their customers given that their interests are closely 
aligned, in the future, customers should not have to rely on the will of 
corporate protectors to challenge data-collection laws. 
CONCLUSION 
New York City has had a contentious relationship with Airbnb from the 
start, and the local government is determined not to let the undeniable 
popularity of the home sharing model rule the day.  The passage of Local 
Law 146 is a high-water mark for home sharing data-collection laws in the 
United States, spurred by flagrant noncompliance with the existing ban on 
short-term rentals.  The collection of non-anonymized data of all Airbnb user 
transactions on a monthly basis takes the administrative search doctrine to a 
new level, and endorsing this approach would dramatically alter the online 
privacy landscape.  However, regardless of the result of Airbnb’s challenge 
to the law and the court’s weighing of its privacy rights as a business, the 
important question of individual Airbnb customers’ privacy rights will likely 
remain unanswered.  Airbnb hosts in New York City or their counterparts 
who face future data-collection laws elsewhere should challenge traditional 
third-party doctrine assumptions by bringing as-applied challenges, and 
claim that indiscriminate data-collection statutes violate their Fourth 
Amendment rights.  While the third-party doctrine could frustrate this type 
of challenge, Carpenter has shown that the doctrine itself is poised for 
change. 
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